and:Researchers from the CERT division of Software Engineer Institute (SEI) at Carnegie Mellon University, which "works closely with the Department of Homeland Security," were set to give a talk purporting to demonstrate a way to deanonymize Tor users at Black Hat USA, a major cybersecurity conference, in early August. Alexander Volynkin and Michael McCord, both researchers at CMU, were slated to disclose a method for identifying Tor users and services with "newly discovered shortcomings in design and implementation of the Tor network," an abstract for the talk said, that only cost $3,000 or so to exploit.
But on Monday, the presentation was abruptly canceled. Black Hat organizers were told by legal counsel for the SEI and Carnegie Mellon University that Volynkin would "not be able to speak at the conference because the materials that he would be speaking about have not yet been approved by CMU/SEI for public release"
SourceThe researchers behind Black Hat presentation originally referenced the NSA's tactics in their talk title: "You don't have to be the NSA to break Tor."
Alexander Volynkin and Michael McCord’s talk was to center on how adversaries could “de-anonymize hundreds of thousands Tor clients and thousands of hidden services within a couple of months,” and do so cheaply.
SourceTo be sure, Tor has its vulnerabilities. The NSA likely put the screws to CMU to back off, the former intelligence official said, and there are two probable reasons: either to protect its own use of Tor or to ensure that knowledge of how to crack Tor remains within a more limited circle.
We believe they used a combination of two classes of attacks: a traffic confirmation attack and a Sybil attack.
On July 4 2014 we found a group of relays that we assume were trying to deanonymize users. They appear to have been targeting people who operate or access Tor hidden services. The attack involved modifying Tor protocol headers to do traffic confirmation attacks.
The attacking relays joined the network on January 30 2014, and we removed them from the network on July 4. While we don't know when they started doing the attack, users who operated or accessed hidden services from early February through July 4 should assume they were affected.
Found it,
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/recent-black-hat-2014-talk-cancellation
Tehnical details of the attack they did:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-security-advisory-relay-early-traffic-confirmation-attack
Bad and Malicious relays will always exist on the network. They just get discovered and routed out. tor is not an end all to being anonymous, it still falls back on the user to be smart and use many different ways to stay anonymous online.
Sounds like that was something different, especially since it was identified and fixed prior to their talk about this other issue being shut down in August. Seems like the national security gag order is still in place based on the article, so this publicly known attack is unlikely to be the same attack they identified. I certainly understand why the Tor Project would want to conflate the two though.
From the technical attack at the bottom:
OPEN QUESTIONS:
Q1) Was this the Black Hat 2014 talk that got canceled recently?
We spent several months trying to extract information from the researchers who were going to give the Black Hat talk, and eventually we did get some hints from them about how "relay early" cells could be used for traffic confirmation attacks, which is how we started looking for the attacks in the wild. They haven't answered our emails lately, so we don't know for sure, but it seems likely that the answer to Q1 is "yes". In fact, we hope they *were* the ones doing the attacks, since otherwise it means somebody else was.
My FUD meter started ringing when she said that, but as I listened, it sounded to me like she was talking about Google Adwords etc, certain ad networks seem to tick the boxes.That Dark web doco talks about a site where the personal information/marketing data can be auctioned....anyone know what site that is?